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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes what environmental policy is implemented by governments when there is cross-ownership
between polluting firms that care about social concerns. We compare the equilibrium outcomes under envi-
ronmental taxes, tradable emission permits and emission standards. We find that the concern of firms about
corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is decided endogenously, depends on the environmental policy
implemented by the government. The greatest concern is obtained under tradable emission permits and the low-
est under emission standards. We also find that cross-ownership between firms affects the CSR level that they
choose. Finally, social welfare is at its highest with tradable permits and at its lowest with an emission standard,
implying that the government prefers, when possible, to set tradable emission permits rather than the other two
policies.
1. Introduction
This paper analyzes the environmental policy implemented by gov-
ernments to make firms internalize the externalities generated by their
production processes. Three types of environmental policy are consid-
ered: Environmental taxes, tradable emission permits, and emission
standards. The literature analyzing these policies considers different
factors that influence them, such as the technology used by firms, the
type of market competition, and the size of the market. In this paper
we consider two factors that can be observed in modern economies and
which influence the environmental policy of governments: The fact that
firms care about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the existence
of cross-ownership between firms.1
Firms may be interested in acquiring a stake in their rivals which
gives them a share in the profit but not in the decision making of those
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1 Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo (2012, 2017) and Dong and Chang (2020)show that cross-ownership may affect the environmental policy set by governments assuming
pure profit maximizing firms.
2 Alley (1997) discusses why partial ownership arrangements are formed.
3 One exception is the paper by Bárcena-Ruiz and Sagasta (2021), who analyze the CSR level chosen by firms under cross-ownership, but without considering
polluting firms.
rivals (see Gilo et al., 2006). This is because cross-ownership may facili-
tate collusion by reducing the incentives of the firms to compete, which
decreases market competition and raises prices and profits (see, e.g.,
Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Malueg, 1992;
Ono et al., 2004).2
In today’s economy, firms engaged in cross-ownership care about
social concerns. This is important since the fact that firms may have pas-
sive investments in their rivals may affect the weight that they attach
to CSR (the CSR level) in their objective functions. This means that
firms need to take cross-ownership into account when deciding their
CSR levels. However, the literature studying CSR usually assumes that
each firm is owned by a different shareholder, so the effect of cross-
ownership on the CSR level chosen by firms is ignored.3
Most papers that analyze the behavior of firms in product mar-
kets assume that the objective of private firms is to maximize their
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own profits. However, the objective function of private firms may also
include corporate social responsibility (see, e. g., Porter and Kramer,
2006; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012). In this regard, Kitzmueller
and Shimshack (2012) argue that CSR refers to social or environmental
behavior of firms that goes beyond their legal requirements. In addition,
Lambertini and Tampieri (2015) point out that firms concerned with
CSR care not only about the interests of their owners but also about
consumers, workers and the environment. In fact, CSR has become an
important business strategy, which has earned it increasing attention
from researchers.4 Most of the studies published measure CSR concerns
through consumer surplus, so the objective function of a consumer-
friendly firm is a convex combination of consumer surplus and its profit
(see, e.g., Kopel and Brand, 2012; Lambertini and Tampieri, 2015; Kim
et al., 2019). This means that consumer-friendly firms make an effort
to satisfy consumers.
In today’s economy firms that pollute the environment have to
abate emissions, because governments implement environmental poli-
cies such as environmental taxes, emission standards, and tradable
emission permits. The analysis of optimal environmental taxes under
imperfect competition has received a great deal of attention. This prob-
lem is analyzed, considering a single market and imperfectly competi-
tive firms, by Buchanan (1969) and Barnett (1980). Their analysis has
subsequently been extended to consider an oligopolistic market (see,
e.g., Kennedy, 1994). The economic literature that analyzes the envi-
ronment has also considered the use of standards and tradable emission
permits, and compared the different environmental policies. Helfand
(1999) and Requate (2006) review the main arguments over pollution
taxes versus standards. Requate (1993) characterizes the optimal tax
and the optimal tradable permit policy as a function of a critical dam-
age parameter. Montero (2002) compares environmental research and
development incentives offered by emission standards and tradeable
permits.5 The papers cited above share one characteristic: Firms are
pure profit maximizers.
In view of the increasing empirical evidence that firms engage in
CSR activities,6 in recent years more and more papers have studied the
environmental policies implemented by governments, assuming that
firms care about social concerns. Some of those studies consider that
the CSR level is exogenously given (see, e.g., Lambertini and Tampieri,
2015; Liu et al., 2015; García et al., 2018; Leal et al., 2018; Xu and Lee,
2018; Chen et al., 2019). However, the CSR level may be a strategic
variable for firms (see, e.g., Lee and Park, 2019; Hirose et al., 2017)
since it affects their behavior in the product market.
In this paper we consider one country with two polluting firms that
care about CSR. We consider a symmetric model so the results are not
due to the asymmetries of the model. Thus, we assume that there is
symmetric cross-ownership between firms. The government may imple-
ment environmental taxes, tradable emission permits or emission stan-
4 Different factors that influence CSR have been analyzed, such as competi-
tion in international markets (Chang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2018), capacity
choice (Nakamura, 2014), endogenous timing games (Matsumura and Ogawa,
2014, 2016; Kopel, 2015), first-mover advantages (Hirose et al., 2017), ver-
tically related markets (Chen et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2019), privatization
policies (Xu and Lee, 2019; Kim et al., 2019; Dong and Bárcena-Ruiz, 2021),
unionized labor (Fanti and Buccella, 2019), R&D investments (Leal et al., 2019;
Dong and Bárcena-Ruiz, 2020), the strategic use of CSR (Planer-Friedrich and
Sahm, 2020) and financial distress risk (Boubaker et al., 2020).
5 Kiyono and Okuno-Fujiwara (2003) compare emission taxes, quotas, and
standard assuming perfectly competitive economies, international trade, and
global externalities. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) analyze location decisions
of a monopolist which faces a tax on its emissions under time consistent and
precommitment environmental policies.
6 KPMG (2017) reviews corporate social responsibility and sustainability
reporting from a large number of companies in 49 countries. Gallego-Sosa et
al. (2021) find that two thirds of the European banks studied show a commit-
ment to CSR.
dards to make firms internalize their polluting emissions. As in Plan-
er-Friedrich and Sahm (2020), we consider the CSR level as a strategic
variable decided by the owners of firms, so they choose it taking into
account profits only. However, when the outputs of the firms are chosen
social concerns are also considered.
Our study extends the paper by García et al. (2018). They consider
two firms, assume that only one of them cares about social concerns,
and take the CSR level as exogenously given. They assume two regu-
latory instruments: Taxes and tradable permits. We extend their paper
by considering that both firms care about social concerns, that the CSR
level is chosen endogenously and that there is cross-ownership between
firms. In addition to the cases of taxes and tradable emission permits,
we also analyze the case where the government sets an emission stan-
dard.
There is empirical evidence supporting the analysis undertaken in
the paper. Evidence of cross-ownership between polluting firms that
care about CSR can be found, for example, in the automobile sector.
One example is given by Toyota which currently owns a 5.1% stake
in Mazda, 20% in Subaru and 4.94% in Suzuki, and in return Mazda
takes a 0.25% and Suzuki a 0.2% stake in Toyota, respectively. Another
example is that of Renault and Nissan Motor (Renault holds a 44.3%
equity stake in Nissan Motor and Nissan Motor owns a 15% stake in
Renault, see www.renault.com).7 The firms mentioned in the examples
care about CSR, as they report on their corporate websites. In addition,
the production plants of these firms pollute the environment and the
governments of the countries where their plants are located implement
environmental policies to make firms internalize the negative external-
ities that they generate.
We find that the environmental policy implemented by the govern-
ment affects the weight attached to social concerns by firms in their
objective functions. Moreover, cross-ownership affects the optimal level
of CSR chosen by firms because it affects both profits from shares in
one’s own firm and those from the shares owned in the rival firm.
In fact, under both environmental taxes and tradable emission per-
mits the CSR level chosen by firms increases with the degree of cross-
ownership between them. However, under emission standards the CSR
level increases (decreases) with the degree of cross-ownership between
firms when it is low (high) enough. In addition, firms are most (least)
concerned about social issues if the government implements tradable
emission permits (emission standards). This is because with a standard
the abatement cost is quadratic in the production level, so an increase in
the CSR level has less effect on output than with the other two policies.
Under environmental taxes, when a firm decides its optimal CSR level,
it takes into account that a higher CSR level implies greater produc-
tion, leading the firm to pay greater environmental taxes and reducing
its profits. This effect is not present under tradable emission permits as
firms do not trade permits in equibrium, so they do not have to pay
for permits. Finally, the difference between the CSR levels chosen by
firms under tradable emission permits and under taxes decreases with
the degree of cross-ownership between firms. However, the difference
between the CSR levels chosen by firms under tradable emission per-
mits and standards and under taxes and standards increases with the
degree of cross-ownership between firms.
We also find that social welfare is greater with tradable emission
permits than with an environmental tax, and that it is greater with a tax
than with an emission standard. This result differs from that obtained
7 An additional example is found in media cross-ownership in the United
States: The New York Times’ former ownership of WQXR Radio and the Chicago
Tribune’s similar relationship with WGN Radio (WGN-AM) and Television
(WGN-TV).
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when CSR is not considered, assuming a symmetric model.8 Taking into
account the three environmental policies analyzed, the environmental
policy implemented by the government should therefore be tradable
emission permits. Empirical evidence shows that for some types of pol-
lutant emissions countries prefer to use tradable permits as an environ-
mental policy measure. This is the case, for example, with the regulation
of carbon dioxide emissions. The European Union has an internal mar-
ket for the trade of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission permits between
private entities (Colla et al., 2012). Another example is the US Acid Rain
Program, a market-based initiative taken by the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency that seeks to reduce overall atmospheric lev-
els of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides (Chan et al., 2018). However,
the problem with the use of tradable permits is that it means creating
markets to trade permits, and this has not always been achieved. This
is why governments use other environmental policy instruments. One
instrument widely used by countries is environmental taxation, which
is high on the European political agenda, as indicated in Speck and
Paleari (2016). These authors point out that energy, carbon, and trans-
port taxes are by far the most commonly used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the model. Sections 3, 4, and 5 analyze the environmental policy imple-
mented by the government and the CSR levels chosen by the firms when
the government sets an environmental tax, an emission standard, and a
tradable permits regulation, respectively. Section 6 compares the results
and provides the main findings. Finally, Section 7 contains some con-
cluding remarks.
2. The model
We consider a duopolistic industry in which firms produce a homo-
geneous good and are engaged in Cournot competition. The inverse




, where p denotes the
market price and qi is the output produced by firm i, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2.
Firms have identical technology, with a constant marginal cost c for
both firms.
We assume that there is bilateral partial cross-ownership. Firm i
owns 𝛼i percent of the stock of firm j, which in turn owns 𝛼j percent of
the stock of its rival, where 𝛼i = 𝛼j < 1∕2 .9 Hence, each firm has
a share in its rival’s profits but not in the rival’s decision making. To
simplify the analysis we assume that 𝛼i = 𝛼j = 𝛼. Given that firm
i owns 𝛼 percent of the stock of firm j and (1 − 𝛼) percent of its own
stock, the income of the owner of firm i is given by:
Πi = (1 − 𝛼)𝜋i + 𝛼𝜋j, i ≠ j; i, j = 1, 2, (1)
where 𝜋 i is the profit of firm i.
Following Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2020), the owner of firm i
publicly commits to a certain function Vi. This means that it has the
decision-making power to choose how much weight is attached to social
concern (the CSR level), 𝜃i, in the objective function of firm i. This
objective function is the following:
Vi = (1 − 𝛼)𝜋i + 𝛼𝜋j + 𝜃iCS, i ≠ j; i, j = 1, 2, (2)
where CS denotes the consumer surplus, and 𝜃i ∈ [0,1] denotes the
weight that firm i puts on consumer surplus in addition to profits.
8 Helfand (1999) argues that when firms do not care about CSR, taxes and
standards generate the same social welfare if firms are identical and there is
no uncertainty. He also points out that the greater efficiency of taxes compared
to standards depends on several factors, such as how standards are formulated,
whether there are information asymmetries, and how conditions change over
time. Baumol and Oates (1988, ch. 4) find that taxes are superior when firms
differ. Holland (2012) shows that under certain conditions emission taxes are
dominated by intensity standards. Requate (1993) finds that a permit policy
leads to a greater welfare than a tax policy for a wide range of parameters.
9 In line with previous literature (Gilo et al., 2006; De Haas et al., 2016), it is
assumed that the values of the shareholding are exogenously given.
Hence, 𝜃i = 0 means that the owner of firm i only cares about its
incomes. In contrast, 𝜃i = 1 implies that the owner of firm i cares
about its income and the whole consumer surplus. The weight attached
to consumer surplus by firm i, 𝜃i, is endogenously determined since it
is a strategic decision variable for the firm. Thus, firms strategically
choose a level of CSR which determines how much weight they put on
consumer surplus in their objective function. As usual, consumer sur-
plus is given by CS = (q1 + q2)2∕2.
As in Planer-Friedrich and Sahm (2020), such a commitment to a
given objective function can be achieved by hiring a manager and giv-
ing him/her incentives to maximize the above objective function.10
Firms release emissions in the production process that damage the
environment. Each unit of output produced causes one unit of pollutant
emissions. However, firms can prevent pollution by undertaking abate-
ment activities. We denote by ai the abatement level of firm i. Abating
emissions entails a positive cost, and the total cost of pollution abate-
ment is given by C(ai) = k a2i ∕2.
11 The total emission level of firm i is
denoted by ei, and the environmental damage function is quadratic in
the total emission level; this function is given by ED = g(e1 + e2)2∕2,
where g measures the rate at which greenhouse gas emissions accumu-
late in the atmosphere.
The government is concerned with maintaining environmental qual-
ity. We consider three policy options that the government can use to
protect the environment. First we assume that the government sets
up an environmental tax per unit of pollution emitted, denoted by t.
Firm i abates ai due to the tax, so its total emission level is given by
ei = qi − ai. Therefore, the total taxes collected by the government
are T = t (e1 + e2). In that case, the profits of firm i are given by:
𝜋i = (p − c)qi − t(qi − ai) − ka2i ∕2, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (3)
The second regulatory policy considered is a tradable permits regu-
lation. Following García et al. (2018), we assume that the government
chooses the total emission level of the industry that maximizes social
welfare and assigns an emission quota (permit) to each firm, denoted
by E.12 In addition, the government allows the firms to trade emission
permits in a perfectly competitive emissions market. Permits are traded
at the market clearing price, which is denoted by 𝜆. Firms behave as
price takers since they do not have market power in the emission mar-
ket. Let the net demand for emission permits of firm i be Di = ei − E.
Total net demand is zero at the market equilibrium, so D1 + D2 = 0.
Firm i abates emissions by an amount ai, so its abatement costs are
C(ai) = k(ai)2∕2. The environmental damage caused by the pollutant
emissions is ED = g(2E)2∕2. Therefore, the profit of firm i can be writ-
ten as:
𝜋i = (p − c)qi − 𝜆(qi − ai − E) − k(ai)2∕2, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (4)
The third regulatory policy consists of applying an emission stan-
dard to control pollution. In this case, the government sets specific lim-
its on the amount of pollutants that can be released into the environ-
ment by each firm. Abating emissions is expensive, so firms abate pollu-
tion emissions to comply exactly with the upper limit. If the government
sets an emission standard s, firm i has to abate emissions by ai = qi − s
10 Profit maximizing firms have an incentive to commit to higher outputs by
delegating the production decision to a manager (see Englmaier, 2011; Kräker,
2005; Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Sklivas, 1987; and Vickers, 1985).
11 The assumption that the cost of reducing emissions is independent of the
cost of production can be justified on the basis of existing evidence. For exam-
ple, firms can reduce their pollutant emissions through more efficient energy
use, responsible water management, efficient resource management, and reduc-
ing the volume and pollutant load of waste by installing filters and treatment
plants. All these measures entail costly investments that seek to reduce emis-
sions and do not affect production costs. See Cembureau (1999) for different
measures for the case of cement production.
12 The two firms are identical, so we assume that the government must assign
the same number of emission permits to each one.
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to meet the standard. Abatement costs depend on the level of output
and the emission standard, and are given by C(ai) = k(qi − s)2∕2. The
environmental damage caused by pollutant emissions is ED = g(2s)2∕2.
Therefore, the profit of firm i is given by:
𝜋i = (p − c)qi − k(qi − s)2∕2, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (5)
The social welfare considered by the government comprises the prof-
its of both firms, consumer surplus, the total taxes collected by the gov-
ernment (if any), and the environmental damage caused by the produc-
tion process:
W = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 + CS + T − ED. (6)
where T = 0 except when the government implements an environmen-
tal tax.
We consider a five-stage game with the following timing: In stage
0, the government chooses the environmental policy that maximizes
social welfare, which may be an environmental tax, a tradable emission
permits regulation or an emission standard.13 In the first stage, the gov-
ernment can commit to a specific level of the environmental policy.14
In the second stage, the owners of the firms simultaneously choose how
much weight to attach to the consumer surplus in Vi to maximize their
incomes. In the third stage, the firms observe the environmental policy
set by the government and the weight attached to consumer surplus.
Under a tradable permits regulation, the price of the permits is set in
the market. Then, under an environmental tax and a tradable emission
permits, firms independently and simultaneously choose their abate-
ment levels to maximize their objective functions. This stage does not
exist under an emission standard as the firms abate emissions to com-
ply exactly with the standard set by the government. Finally, in the
last stage the firms choose their optimal production levels. The solu-
tion concept used is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Therefore, the solutions are derived by backward induction
from the last stage. To simplify the presentation of results we assume
that g = k = 1.15
3. Environmental taxes
Next we analyze the case in which the government implements an
environmental tax, denoted by superscript t. In the fourth stage of the
game both firms choose the production level, qi, that maximize Vi given
by (2), i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. The profits of the firms that appear in Vi are
given by (3). Solving this problem, we find that the equilibrium outputs
of each firm are:
qi =
(A − c − t) (1 − 𝛼)
(




3 − 2𝛼 − 𝜃i − 𝜃j
) , (7)
In the third stage, firms choose their abatement level, ai. The differen-
tiation of equation (2) with respect to ai yields:
ai = aj = t, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (8)
The equilibrium output levels are a function of the shares that each
firm has in its rival, the CSR levels, and the tax. The output of firm i
13 We assume that the environmental policy chosen by the government (envi-
ronmental taxes, emission standards or tradable emission permits) is the same
for the two firms since they produce a homogeneous good with the same pollut-
ing technology and symmetric cross-ownership. If the government were to set
up an environmental policy for each firm, in equilibrium, given the symmetry
of the model, those environmental policies would be identical.
14 We consider the cases where the government has the ability to commit
to an announced policy. This is because the government wants to maintain
a reputation for sticking to its announced policies or the assumption is also
reasonable under binding international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions when countries are expected to comply with the agreements.
15 It can be shown that the main results hold true for values of k and g other
than 1.
is increasing at its CSR level (∂qi∕∂𝜃i > 0), and decreasing at that of
the rival firm (∂qi∕∂𝜃j < 0) except when 𝜃i = 1 (only when 𝜃i = 1,
then ∂qi∕∂𝜃j = 0). A higher 𝜃i implies that the consumer surplus has
a greater weight in the objective function of firm i, which means that
this firm produces more and its rival less. The outputs of both firms
are decreasing under the environmental tax since it is a cost for them.
Finally, expression (8) is the usual condition which states that firm i
abates pollution to the point where the marginal abatement cost equals
the tax. The abatement level of firm i, ai, increases with the tax, t.
In the second stage of the game, taking into account the quantities
and abatement levels given by (7) and (8), the owner of firm i chooses
the CSR level 𝜃i in order to maximize its income given by (1). Given the
symmetry of the model, in equilibrium 𝜃t1 = 𝜃
t
2 = 𝜃
t .16 From the first
order conditions of this problem, the following result emerges.
Proposition 1. When the government implements an environmental tax,
the CSR level chosen by the owner of each firm is
𝜃t = 5 − 2𝛼 −
√
17 − 20𝛼 + 4𝛼2
4
,
where ∂𝜃t∕∂𝛼 > 0.
This proposition shows that the CSR level chosen by the owner
of each firm is positive and increasing in parameter 𝛼. In addition,
𝜃t ∈ [0.2192,0.2928] so 𝜃t increases slightly with 𝛼. Finally, 𝜃t does
not depend on the tax since it is a cost per unit of emission and thus per
unit of production, so the tax disappears when calculating 𝜃t .
The explanation of why 𝜃t increases with 𝛼 is the following: When
𝛼 increases, each owner has more shares in the rival firm and fewer in
its own firm. If an owner increases its own consumer concern its own
firm produces more and the rival firm produces less, which increases
the profit of its own firm at the expense of the rival. The effect of an
increase in the profits of its own firm more than offsets the reduction
in profits from the shares owned in the rival firm. This causes the CSR
level to increase with parameter 𝛼.
In the first stage of the game, the government chooses the optimal
environmental tax that maximizes social welfare given by (6). Solving,
we find that the optimal tax is the following:
t =
(A − c) (1 − 𝛼)
(
9 − 10𝛼 +
√
17 − 20𝛼 + 4𝛼2
)
39 − 64𝛼 + 28𝛼2 + (7 − 10𝛼)
√
17 − 20𝛼 + 4𝛼2
. (9)
From expression (9) it emerges that the optimal environmen-
tal tax imposed by the government is positive and decreasing in 𝛼
(∂t∕∂𝛼 < 0). This is because a greater parameter 𝛼 implies more col-
lusion between firms and thus less production and emissions, so the
government levies a lower tax to avoid excessive further reductions in
production, which is already below the optimum level.
Substituting the optimal environmental tax and CSR levels in equa-
tions (7) and (8), the output and abatement levels of the firms, their
profits, consumer and producer surpluses, the total taxes collected by
the government, and the social welfare are obtained. These expressions
are relegated to Appendix 1.
4. Tradable emission permits
Next we consider that the government decides the total pollu-
tant emissions and assign emission permits to each firm in a non-
discriminatory manner. We denote this case by superscript e.
In the fourth stage, firm i chooses the optimal production level, qi,
that maximize Vi given by (2), i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. The profits of the firms
that appear in Vi are given by (4). Solving this problem we obtain the
following:
qi =
(A − c − 𝜆) (1 − 𝛼)
(




3 − 2𝛼 − 𝜃i − 𝜃j
) , i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (10)
16 We make the same simplification in notation throughout the paper.
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It is easy to see that firm i’s output is increasing in its CSR level
(∂qi∕∂𝜃i > 0), and decreasing in the permit price (∂qi∕∂𝜆 < 0) and in
the CSR level considered by the rival firm (∂qi∕∂𝜃j < 0) except when
𝜃i = 1 (only when 𝜃i = 1, then ∂qi∕∂𝜃j = 0).
In the third stage, firms choose their abatement level, ai. The differ-
entiation of equation (2) with respect to ai yields
ai = 𝜆, i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (11)
The firms choose abatement efforts such that the permit price equals
the marginal cost of abatement.
From (10) and (11), taking into account the total net demand of
emission quota D1 + D2 = (q1 − a1 − E) + (q2 − a2 − E) = 0,
the following is obtained:
𝜆 = (A − c) (1 − 𝛼) − E (3 − 2𝛼 − 𝜃1 − 𝜃2)
(4 − 3𝛼 − 𝜃1 − 𝜃2)
. (12)
It is easy to see that the market price of permits increases if the
government reduces the emission quotas of the firms (∂𝜆∕∂E < 0).
Moreover, the greater the consumer concern the higher the market price
of the permits (∂𝜆∕∂𝜃i > 0) since firms produce more and need more
permits.
In the second stage of the game, the owner of firm i chooses the
CSR level, 𝜃i, in order to maximize its income given by (1), taking into
account expressions (10), (11) and (12). Solving, we get the following
result.
Proposition 2. When the government sets up tradable emission permits,
the CSR level chosen by the owner of each firm is
𝜃e = 6 − 3𝛼 −
√
24 − 32𝛼 + 9𝛼2
4
,
where ∂𝜃e∕∂𝛼 > 0.
The explanation of this result is similar to that of Proposition 1, so
we omit it. It is easy to see that 𝜃e ∈ [0.2752,0.3246].
Let I =
√
24 − 32𝛼 + 9𝛼2 > 0. In the first stage of the game, the gov-
ernment assigns the emission quota to each firm so as to maximize
social welfare, given by (6). Solving, we obtain the following:
E = 2 (A − c) (1 − 𝛼) (1 − I)
𝛼(68 + 7I) − 44 − 4I − 27𝛼2 .
The emission quota assigned to each firm, E, is decreasing in 𝛼
(∂E∕∂𝛼 < 0). By acquiring a higher stake in the rival firm, sharehold-
ers commit themselves to more cooperative behavior and thus lower
output and emissions. As a result, the government sets a lower optimal
quota for each firm. Given the symmetry of the model, firms do not
trade emissions in equilibrium so qi − ai − E = 0. This means that
firms do not buy permits and thus only have to pay abatement costs.
Substituting the emission quotas and CSR levels in equations
(10)–(12), the output levels of the firms, their profits, consumer and
producer surpluses, and social welfare are obtained. These expressions
are relegated to Appendix 2.
5. Emission standards
Next we analyze the implementation of an emission standard by the
government. This case is denoted by superscript s. In the last stage, firm
i chooses the optimal production level, qi, that maximizes Vi given by
(2), i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. The profits of the firms that appear in Vi are given
by (5). Solving this problem we obtain the following:
qi =
(A − c + s) (1 − 𝛼)
(




4 − 3𝛼 − 𝜃i − 𝜃j
) , i ≠ j; i, j = 1,2. (13)
An increase in s, which means a less stringent emission standard,
reduces the marginal cost of abatement and increases the output of firm
i.
In the second stage of the game, the owner of firm i chooses the
CSR level, 𝜃i, in order to maximize its income given by (1), taking into
account the second stage production levels. Solving, we get the follow-
ing result.
Proposition 3. When the government implements an emission standard,
the CSR level chosen by the owner of each firm is
𝜃s = 7 − 16𝛼 + 6𝛼
2 −
√
41 − 192𝛼 + 308𝛼2 − 192𝛼3 + 36𝛼4
4(1 − 2𝛼) ,
where 𝜃s is increasing in 𝛼 if 𝛼 < (3 −
√
3)∕6 ≈ 0.2113, and decreasing
in 𝛼 if 𝛼 > (3 −
√
3)∕6.
This proposition shows that when the government sets up an emis-
sion standard, the CSR level increases with 𝛼 if the degree of cross-
ownership between firms is low (i.e. if 𝛼 < (3 −
√
3)∕6); if that degree
is high (i.e. if 𝛼 > (3 −
√
3)∕6), the CSR level decreases with 𝛼. It is
easy to see that 𝜃s ∈ [0.1492,0.1557] when 𝛼 ∈ [0,0.2113], so 𝜃s
increases slightly with 𝛼 in this case. However, 𝜃s ∈ [0.1557,0] when
𝛼 ∈ [0.2113,0.5], so 𝜃s decreases more strongly with 𝛼 in this case.
This result can be explained as follows: An increase in its own con-
sumer concern leads the firm to produce more and its rival to produce
less, which increases the profit of the own firm at the expense of the
rival firm. It has been shown that under environmental taxes and trad-
able emission permits this causes consumer concern to increase strictly
with parameter 𝛼. However, this does not happen under emission stan-
dards since the abatement costs depend on the output level of the firm.
Thus, when 𝛼 is low (which means that collusion between firms is low),
the CSR level increases with 𝛼 because the effect of an increase in the
profits of one firm more than offsets the reduction in profits from its
shares in its rival. However, when 𝛼 is high (which means that collu-
sion between firms is high) each owner has a higher stake in the rival
firm and a lower stake in its own firm. This leads to a reduction in con-
sumer concern since the reduction in profits from the shares in the rival
firm has outweighs the higher profits from the shares in its own firm.
Thus, collusion between firms dominates and at the limit (i.e. when 𝛼
tends to 1/2) the owners of the firms are not concerned about consumer
surplus. Denote H =
√
41 − 192𝛼 + 308𝛼2 − 192𝛼3 + 36𝛼4 > 0. In the
first stage of the game, the government chooses the emission standard
so as to maximize social welfare, given by (6). Solving this problem, we
find that the optimal emission standard is the following:
s = 2 (A − c) (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 2𝛼) (−2 + 3𝛼 + H)(
67 − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2 (40 + H)
) .
It can be shown that the optimal emission standard s is decreasing in
𝛼 (∂s∕∂𝛼 < 0). Increased cross-ownership between rival firms leads to
more collusive outcomes, reducing their outputs. This means that firms
pollute less, so the government sets a lower standard.
Substituting the optimal emission standard and CSR levels in equa-
tion (13), the output levels of the firms, their profits, consumer and
producer surpluses, and social welfare are obtained. These expressions
are relegated to Appendix 3.
6. Comparison of results
In this section, we compare the results obtained under the three
environmental policies that can be implemented by the government.
Then we compare the optimal CSR levels chosen by the owners of the
firms under the three environmental policies considered.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium 𝜃e > 𝜃t > 𝜃s, ∂(𝜃e − 𝜃t)∕∂𝛼 < 0,
∂(𝜃t − 𝜃s)∕∂𝛼 > 0 and ∂(𝜃e − 𝜃s)∕∂𝛼 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
This proposition shows that the concern of the owners of the firms
about social issues depends on the environmental policy chosen by
the government. Concern is greatest when the government implements
tradable emission permits, it takes an intermediate value when the gov-
ernment sets up an environmental tax, and it is lowest when the policy
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chosen by the government is an emission standard. This result can be
explained as follows: Without cross-ownership (i.e. when 𝛼 = 0), the
owners of the firms choose the CSR level to gain market share and prof-
its at the expense of the rival firm, taking into account only their own
profits. If a firm increases its CSR level, for a given CSR level of the
other firm it produces more at the expense of the rival. The incentive to
increase CSR differs under the three environmental policies considered.
When the government sets an emission standard, the abatement cost is
quadratic in the production level, which is not the case for the other
two policies. This means that with a standard an increase in the CSR
level has less effect on output than with the other two policies. As a
result, the optimal CSR level chosen under an emission standard is the
lowest of the three cases. A comparison of the other two cases shows
that 𝜃e > 𝜃t . This is because when firms decide their optimal CSR lev-
els there is an additional effect under environmental taxes that is not
present under tradable emission permits. Under environmental taxes,
when firm i decides its optimal CSR level it takes into account that a
higher CSR level implies greater production, leading the firm to pay
greater environmental taxes and reducing its profits. However, under
tradable emission permits this negative effect is not present because
firms do not trade permits in equilibrium, and thus they do not have to
pay for the permits. This leads owners to choose a higher CSR level in
the second case.
The above result holds for all values of parameter 𝛼. Cross-
ownership has been shown above to generate an effect that affects the
optimal CSR level (as seen in Propositions 1 to 3), because it affects
both profits from shares in one’s own firm and those from the shares
owned in the rival firm. However, the government takes this effect into
account when choosing its environmental policy. As the environmental
policy is taken for efficiency reasons, the effect of cross-ownership is
not strong enough to alter the result obtained when 𝛼 = 0.
Propositions 1 to 3 show that the difference between the CSR levels
chosen by the owners of the firms under tradable emission permits and
environmental taxes is decreasing in 𝛼 (∂(𝜃e − 𝜃t)∕∂𝛼 < 0). The opti-
mal CSR level is higher under tradable permits than under taxes, but it
increases at a lower rate than 𝜃t with 𝛼. As shown above, there is an
additional negative effect under taxes that is not present under tradable
emission permits because an increase in social concern implies more
production, increasing the taxes that the firms have to pay and leading
them to choose lower CSR levels. But the optimal taxes are decreasing
in 𝛼, so this negative effect becomes weaker with higher levels of cross-
ownership, reducing the difference between the CSR levels chosen by
the owners of the firms under tradable emission permits and environ-
mental taxes.
We also find that the difference between the CSR levels chosen by
the owners of the firms under tradable emission permits and under
an emission standard and the difference between the levels that they
choose under environmental taxes and under an emission standard are
increasing in 𝛼 (∂(𝜃t − 𝜃s)∕∂𝛼 > 0, ∂(𝜃e − 𝜃s)∕∂𝛼 > 0). As shown
above, this is because 𝜃t and 𝜃e increase with parameter 𝛼 while 𝜃s
increases with 𝛼 only when this parameter is low enough.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, CSe > CSt > CSs, EDe > EDt > EDs
and 𝜋s > 𝜋e > 𝜋t for any 𝛼 < 1∕2.
Proof. See Appendix 5.
This proposition shows that the consumer surplus and environmen-
tal damage are lowest when the government sets up an emission stan-
dard and highest under tradable emission permits. However, the profits
of the firms are highest with an emission standard and lowest with envi-
ronmental taxes.
Proposition 4 shows that 𝜃e > 𝜃t > 𝜃s, which means that firms
attach most weight to consumer surplus under tradable emission per-
mits and least under emission standards. This means that industry out-
put is greatest with tradable emission permits and lowest with an emis-
sion standard (qe > qt > qs). Since consumer surplus depends exclu-
sively on aggregate production levels, the greatest consumer surplus is
obtained when the government sets tradable emission permits and the
lowest when it sets emission standards (CSe > CSt > CSs).
Although the firms reduce emissions at different levels under the
three environmental policies, the main factor in explaining environ-
mental damage is their output levels. As qe > qt > qs it emerges that
EDe > EDt > EDs.
Finally, Proposition 5 states that firms earn higher profits with emis-
sion standards than with tradable emission permits, and that with per-
mits they earn higher profits than with environmental taxes. If only
production costs are considered, as the marginal cost is constant, then
usually more production usually means greater profits. However, the
costs associated with the different environmental policies need to be
taken into account here. It is easy to check that greater production
implies greater abatement costs. It is under emission standards that
firms produce the least, face the lowest abatement costs and therefore
obtain the greatest profits. Under tradable emission permits firms pro-
duce more and have greater abatement costs than under environmental
taxes. However, in the first case firms do not acquire permits in equilib-
rium so they do not pay for them, but in the second case firms pay envi-
ronmental taxes. As a result, firms obtain greater profits under emission
permits than under taxes.
In stage 0, the government chooses the environmental policy that
maximizes social welfare. From Proposition 5, the following result
emerges.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, We > Wt > Ws.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
This proposition shows that social welfare is lowest when the gov-
ernment sets up an emission standard and highest under tradable emis-
sion permits.17 Comparing the welfare obtained with tradable emission
permits and with environmental taxes, it emerges that the greater con-
sumer surplus and profits obtained under tradable emission permits
offset the greater environmental damage and taxes collected by the
government. A comparison of the welfare obtained under an environ-
mental tax and that obtained under an emission standard reveals that
the greater consumer surplus with the tax and the total taxes collected
by the government offset the greater environmental damage and lower
profits of the firms. Therefore, it is obtained that the environmental
policy chosen by the government should be tradable emission permits.
Emission permits provide the basis in the United States for both the
Sulfur Permit Program to control acid rain and the Lead Elimination
Program to facilitate the elimination of lead in gasoline (Tietenberg,
1995). The use of tradable permits implies creating markets to trade
permits, which has not always been achieved, so environmental taxes
are widely used (OECD, 2001).
It is easy to check that these differences between social welfare lev-
els are increasing in 𝛼 (∂(We − Wt)∕∂𝛼 > 0, ∂(Wt − Ws)∕∂𝛼 > 0
and ∂(We − Ws)∕∂𝛼 > 0). Regarding the first, given that
∂(CSe − CSt)∕∂𝛼 < 0, ∂(𝜋e − 𝜋t)∕∂𝛼 < 0, ∂(EDe − EDt)∕∂𝛼 > 0
and ∂T∕∂𝛼 < 0, the latter effect leads the revenues of the gov-
ernment to decrease with cross-ownership offsetting the other effects
and making the difference between social welfare with tradable per-
mits and taxes decrease with 𝛼. With regard to the second, given
that ∂(CSt − CSs)∕∂𝛼 > 0, ∂(𝜋s − 𝜋t)∕∂𝛼 > 0 if 𝛼 < 0.4741,
∂(EDt − EDs)∕∂𝛼 > 0 and ∂T∕∂𝛼 < 0, the first effect (the difference
between consumer surpluses increases with 𝛼) offsets the others.
7. Extension
In this section we consider two extensions of the main model: First
we consider a quadratic cost function; and second we assume that there
17 It can be shown that if firms do not care about social concerns, social welfare
is the same in the three cases: We = Wt = Ws.
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are n firms competing in the product market with constant marginal
costs of production. We find that the main results hold in both cases.
We study first whether the structure of the cost function affects the
results obtained in the paper. We assume that the firms have the same
quadratic production cost function given by C(qi) = q2i , i = 1, 2. The
other assumptions are the same as in the previous section. We omit the
resolution of the game, since it is similar to the constant marginal cost
case.18 We denote this case by a cap (circumflex accent mark). A com-
parison of the results obtained under the three environmental policies
that can be implemented by the government reveals that 𝜃e > 𝜃t > 𝜃s
and Ŵe > Ŵt > Ŵs. Therefore, the same result is obtained as under
constant marginal costs of production. This is because the effects that
arise under the two cost structures are the same. How firms respond to
the policies set by the government is not affected by the structure of
production costs. The structure of the cost functions affects the level of
production of the firms and therefore the amount of the reduction in
their emissions. However, this is not sufficient to change the results of
the model as all three cases are affected in a similar way.
Next, we consider that there are n firms competing in the product
market that face constant marginal cost of production. We also find
in this case that the main results of the model hold. The resolution of
this case is cumbersome, so to compare the results obtained we had
to run simulations. We find that the main result holds for all values
of parameters 𝛼 and n. To illustrate this case, we present the results
obtained for 𝛼 = 1∕4.19 We denote this case by adding an n in the
superscript. We omit the resolution of the game, since it is similar to
that of the duopoly case. A comparison of the results obtained under
the three environmental policies that can be implemented by the gov-
ernment reveals that 𝜃en > 𝜃tn > 𝜃sn and Ŵen > Ŵtn > Ŵsn. Therefore,
the same result is obtained as with a duopoly market. As the number
of firms competing in the product market increases, so does the compe-
tition between them, which means that each produces less and has to
reduce emissions by less, but as firms are affected similarly in all three
cases, the results do not change. Therefore, the response of firms to the
policies set by the government is not affected by the number of firms
competing in the product market.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we analyze the effects of three environmental regula-
tory policies (environmental taxes, tradable emission permits, and emis-
sion standards) in a quantity setting duopoly where cross-ownership
and the corporate social responsibility of firms are used together. We
find that the CSR level chosen by the firms is related to the environ-
mental policy implemented by the government: The degree of consumer
friendliness is highest when the government sets up a tradable emission
permits and lowest under the optimal standards. We also find that cross-
ownership affects the optimal level of CSR chosen by firms. With both
environmental taxes and tradable emission permits, the CSR level cho-
sen by firms is increasing with the degree of cross-ownership between
firms. However, with emission standards the CSR level is increasing
(decreasing) with the degree of cross-ownership when it is low (high).
We also find that welfare is greatest when tradable emission permits
are used to control pollution, and lowest with emission standards.
In a society with increasing concern for the environment and CSR,
these contributions may have significant value in environmental reg-
ulation, as we find that the environmental policy chosen by the gov-
ernment may be a factor that helps to further influence the CSR level
chosen by the firms. Moreover, it is useful for decision-makers to under-
stand the effects of different environmental policies on the level of
social concern chosen by firms, on environmental damage and on social
welfare.
In our analysis we consider a duopolistic industry with constant
marginal costs of production. We find that if there are n firms or if
the production cost function is quadratic, our analysis remains valid.
In the paper we consider that the cost of reducing emissions is inde-
pendent of the cost of production. Therefore, investments in reducing
emissions are intended to comply with environmental legislation and
not to reduce production costs. We do not consider the adoption of
innovative technologies that reduce both production costs and the gen-
eration of pollutant emissions. This goes beyond the objectives of the
paper: It would imply adding a first step in which the choice between
different technologies is analyzed. We leave it for future research.
Declaration of competing interest
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1. Results obtained when the government implements an environmental tax.
Denote G =
√




6 (A − c) (1 − 𝛼)
(
2 (5 + G) − 3𝛼 (5 + G) + 6𝛼2
)
(1 − 2𝛼 + G)
(




2 = 4(A − c)
2(1 − 𝛼)(1089 + 281G − 𝛼(4753 + 911G) + 6𝛼2(1213 + 196G)−)8𝛼3(631 + 75G)
+ 24𝛼4(65 + 3G)(−144𝛼5)∕((1− 2𝛼 + G)2(39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2)2),
EDt =
8(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2
(
17 + G − 3𝛼(7 + G) + 6𝛼2
)2
(1 − 2𝛼 + G)2
(
39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2
)2 ,
CSt =
72(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2
(
2 (5 + G) − 3𝛼 (5 + G) + 6𝛼2
)2
(1 − 2𝛼 + G)2
(
39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2
)2 ,
Tt =
4(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2 (9 − 10𝛼 + G)
(
17 + G − 3𝛼 (7 + G) + 6𝛼2
)
(1 − 2𝛼 + G)
(
39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2
)2 ,
18 The equilibrium results obtained in the three cases are relegated to the
appendix.
19 The equilibrium results obtained in the three cases are relegated to the
appendix.
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Wt = 24(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)(867 + 235G − 7𝛼(563 + 121G) + 6𝛼2(1124 + 195G) − 𝛼3(5500 + 696G)+)
48𝛼4(44 + 3G) − 288𝛼5)∕((1− 2𝛼 + G)2(39 − 64𝛼 + 28𝛼2 + (7 − 10𝛼)G)2).
Appendix 2. Results obtained when the government sets up tradable emission permits. Denote I =
√




6 (A − c) (1 − 𝛼)
(
2 (7 + I) − 𝛼 (22 + 3I) + 9𝛼2
)
(2 − 3𝛼 + I)
(






2 (A − c) (1 − 𝛼)
(
5 (4 + I) − 𝛼 (37 + 6I) + 18𝛼2
)
(2 − 3𝛼 + I)
(




2 = 4(A − c)
2(1 − 𝛼)(4(463 + 134I) − 7𝛼(1300 + 243I)+)𝛼2(15817 + 2167I) − 𝛼3(12691 + 1200I) + 216𝛼4(22 + I)−
(684𝛼5)∕((2− 3𝛼 + I)2(4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2)2),
EDe = 8(A − c)
2(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − I)2(
4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2
)2 ,
CSe =
72(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2
(
2 (7 + I) − 𝛼 (22 + 3I) + 9𝛼2
)2
(2 − 3𝛼 + I)2
(
4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2
)2 ,
We = 24(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)(4(331 + 83I) − 𝛼(6352 + 1173I)+)𝛼2(11449 + 1615I) − 𝛼3(9883 + 984I)(+216𝛼4(19 + I) − 648𝛼5)∕
(2 − 3𝛼 + I)2(4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2)2.
Appendix 3. Results obtained when the government implements an emission standard. Denote H =
√
41 − 192𝛼 + 308𝛼2 − 192𝛼3 + 36𝛼4.
qs1 = q
s
2 = 6(A − c)(1 − 𝛼)(1− 2𝛼)(21 + H − 6𝛼(17 + H) + 2𝛼
2(89 + 3H) − 132𝛼3 + 36𝛼4)∕(1 + H − 6𝛼 + 6𝛼2)
(67 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4),
𝜋s1 = 𝜋
s
2 = 4(A − c)
2(1 − 𝛼)(1− 2𝛼)(4(−427 + 363H) − 48𝛼(47 + 263H)+)𝛼2(127827 + 48641H) − 15𝛼3(48725 − 7327H)
+ 2𝛼4(1031107 + 80084H) − 6𝛼5(577548 + 25445H) + 4𝛼6(918467 + 22575H) − 60𝛼7(41173 + 480H)
(+72𝛼8(14083 + 48H) − 228096𝛼9 + 20736𝛼10)∕((1 + H − 6𝛼 + 6𝛼2)2)(67 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2),
EDs = 8(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 2𝛼)2(3𝛼 + H − 2)2∕(67 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2,
CSs = 36(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2(1 − 2𝛼)2(21 − 132𝛼3 + 36𝛼4 + H − 6𝛼(17 + H)+)2𝛼2(89 + 3H))
∕(67− 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H))2,
Ws = 24(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)(1− 2𝛼)(356 + 636H − 24𝛼(577 + 253H) + 𝛼2(125451 + 25913H)−)3𝛼3(183673 + 21563H)+
14𝛼4(101839 + 7346H) − 6𝛼5(391716 + 17573H) + 4𝛼6(635021 + 16743H) − 12𝛼7(149273 + 1968H) + 78𝛼8(10987 + 48H)−
196992𝛼9 + (20736𝛼10)∕((1+ H − 6𝛼 + 6𝛼2)2(67 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2).
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Appendix 4. Comparing the equilibrium results for social concern under the three environmental policies analyzed, the following results emerge:
𝜃e − 𝜃t = 1 − 𝛼 + G − I
4
> 0,
𝜃t − 𝜃s = −2 − G + H + 2𝛼(2 + G) − 2𝛼
2
4 (1 − 2𝛼)
> 0.
Appendix 5. Comparing the equilibrium results for consumer surpluses, firms’ profits and environmental damage under the three environmental policies
analyzed, the following results emerge:
CSe − CSt = −(864(A − c)2(−1 + 𝛼)3(62 + 46G − 34I − 2GI + 𝛼(−172 − 48G + 23I+)))
((3GI) + 𝛼2(161 + G + 10I) − 50𝛼3)(2026 + 506G + 418I + 98GI − 𝛼(9102 + 1962G+))
(1549I + 329GI) + 𝛼2(15743 + 2875G + 2163I + 369GI) − 3𝛼3(4409 + 615G+)
((438I + 48GI) + 18𝛼4(301 + 24G + 16I) − 864𝛼5)∕((I − 3𝛼 + 2)2)
((4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2)2(G − 2𝛼 + 1)2(39 + 28𝛼2 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G))2)) > 0,
CSt − CSs = −(864(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)4(−10101 − 2381G + 663H + 159GH+))
+ 2𝛼(34928 + 7903G + 296H + 115GH) − 2𝛼2(87564 + 18766G + 9199H + 2257GH)
+ 4𝛼3(38200 + 7778G + 13648H + 2875GH) − 4𝛼4(−22700 − 3216G + 16805H + 2695GH)
+ 8𝛼5(−29472 − 3728G + 4376H + 309GH) + 8𝛼6(6818 − 142G − 325H + 141GH)
− 16𝛼7(−8326 − 1200G + 186H + 9GH) − 48𝛼8(2101 + 189G − 6H)
((+864𝛼9(26 + G) − 1728𝛼10))∕((1+ G − 2𝛼)2(39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32+ 5G) + 28𝛼2)2)
((67 + H − 12𝛼(27 + H) + 14𝛼2(40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2) > 0,
𝜋s − 𝜋e = 96(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2 (16(−1409843 − 366024I + 302567H + 51856IH) − 4𝛼 (−83828860
− 21296791I + 16242732H + 2554835IH) + 4𝛼2 (−560476566 − 139402439I
+ 98190294H − 14107107IH) + 𝛼3 (8868426964 + 2160634083I − 1415388932H
− 184868519IH) + 𝛼4(−22885447867 − 5471998314I + 3394152135H + 401657514IH)
+ 𝛼5(39714646498 + 9388373653I − 5734248210H − 614822939IH) + 𝛼6 (−44907557185
− 10793178048I + 7067213015H + 690797084IH) + 𝛼7 (26770094048 + 7534088412I
− 6516845932H − 588525390IH) + 2𝛼8 (3308582354 − 803770244I + 2296578763H
+ 194312304IH) + 4𝛼9(8003574518 + 660285227I + 627930216H + 49503720IH)
+ 12𝛼10(2943043061 + 274463072I + 88253496H + 6146448IH) + 576𝛼11 (40224314
+ 3355946I + 566973H + 30615IH) + 1728𝛼12(5779984 + 387474I + 37359H + 1152IH)




(I − 3𝛼 + 2)2
(
4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2
)2(1 − 6𝛼 + 6𝛼2 + H)2
(
67 − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4 + H − 12𝛼 (27 + H) + 14𝛼2 (40 + H)
)2)
> 0,
𝜋e − 𝜋t = 32(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2 (4(166017 − 25895G + 369456I + 75440GI) + 𝛼 (12734264 + 2886416G
+ 9042661I + 1983773GI) + 𝛼2(73319237 + 18801053G + 26198322I + 5752672GI)
+ 𝛼3(213859842 + 49251632G + 48105733I + 9691213GI) + 𝛼4 (374476353 + 72410377G
+ 61112922I + 10486344GI) − 2𝛼5(211543241 + 33387252G + 26972264I + 3765768GI)
+ 8𝛼6(39616418 + 5027514G + 3997035I + 440379GI) − 24𝛼7 (6536725 + 652101G
+ 500370I + 40896GI) + 144𝛼8(343799 + 25056G + 17952I + 864GI)




(1 − 2𝛼 + G)2(2 − 3𝛼 + I)2
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(4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68+ 7I) + 27𝛼2)2
(
39 + 7G − 2𝛼 (32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2
)2)
> 0,
EDe − EDt = −24(A − c)2(−1 + 𝛼)3(−302 − 30G + 30I + 14GI𝛼(542 + 66G − 53I − 9GI))
(−3𝛼2(101 + 9G − 6I) + 54𝛼3)(590 − 2G + 226I + 50GI − 𝛼(1628 + 112G))
(+655I + 107GI) + 3𝛼2(589 + 61G + 185I + 23GI) − 3𝛼3(293 + 27G + 46I)
(+162𝛼4)∕((1+ G − 2𝛼)2(4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2)2)
((39 + 7G − 2𝛼(32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2)2) > 0,
EDt − EDs = 24(A − c)2(−1 + 𝛼)3 (−485 − 53G + 47H + 15GH + 𝛼(2490 + 288G − 134H − 40GH)
+ 2𝛼2(−2356 − 276G + 65H + 9GH) + 36𝛼3(112 + 12G − H) − 36𝛼4(43 + 3G) + 216𝛼5
)
(
823 − 25G + 175H + 47GH − 3𝛼(1635 + 9G + 331H + 65GH) + 2𝛼2 (5923 + 272G+
892H + 137GH) − 6𝛼3(2508 + 204G + 205H + 23GH) + 12𝛼4(899 + 87G + 23H)−




(1 + G − 2𝛼)2
(
39 + 7G + H − 2𝛼 (32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2
)2
(67 − 12𝛼 (27 + H) + 14𝛼2 (40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2
)
> 0.
Appendix 6. Comparing the equilibrium results for social welfare under the three environmental policies analyzed, the following results emerge:
We − Wt = 576(A − c)2(1 − 𝛼)2 (4(−51445 − 41261G + 37915I + 3427GI) + 𝛼 (1174908 + 821652G
− 780891I − 68267GI) + 𝛼2(−2670925 − 1709245G + +1713106I + 137972GI)
+ 𝛼3(2914166 + 1931652G − 2112453I − 143141GI) + 𝛼4 (−1174639 − 1296575G
+ 1623436I + 79546GI) − 2𝛼5(302190 − 265543G + 400158I + 11124GI)




(1 + G − 2𝛼)2(2 + I − 3𝛼)2
(4(11 + I) − 𝛼(68 + 7I) + 27𝛼2)2(39 + 7G − 2𝛼 (32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2)2
)
> 0,
Wt − Ws = 2304(A − c)2(−1 + 𝛼)3 (−1591550 − 438734G + 271050H + 60346GH + 𝛼 (22630694
+ 6023146G − 3255986H − 671198GH) + 𝛼2 (−145244443 − 37190719G + 17321301H
+ 3273377GH) + 𝛼3(556101155 + 136329109G − 53739353H − 9179911GH)
+ 𝛼4(−1414109283 − 329827465G + 107789583H + 16304257GH)
+ 𝛼5(2515477453 + 553970267G − 146523221H − 19014675GH) + 2𝛼6 (−1604838206
− 330911439G + 68892447H + 7287280GH) + 𝛼7 (2961239960 + 567246908G
− 90089910H − 7109142GH) + 4𝛼8(−490737737 − 86934011G + 10184412H + 508461GH)
− 4𝛼9(−228594443 − 37559445G + 3127110H + 70236GH) + 24𝛼10 (−11918716 − 1842177





(1 + G − 2𝛼)2
(
1 + H − 6𝛼 + 6𝛼2
)2(39 + 7G + H − 2𝛼 (32 + 5G) + 28𝛼2)2
(67 − 12𝛼 (27 + H) + 14𝛼2 (40 + H) − 408𝛼3 + 108𝛼4)2
)
> 0.
Appendix 7. Quadratic production costs.
When the government implements an environmental tax, the following results emerge. Let denote K1 =
√
73 − 328𝛼 + 512𝛼2 − 320𝛼3 + 64𝛼4.
Solving this case, we find the following:
𝜃t = 9 − 20𝛼 + 8𝛼
2 − K1




1 − 3𝛼 + 2𝛼2
) (
13 − 44𝛼 + 32𝛼2 + K1
)
K1(1 − 4𝛼)(7− 8𝛼) + (127 − 632𝛼 + 1180𝛼2 − 976𝛼3 + 304𝛼4)
,
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Ŵt = 24A2 (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 2𝛼)
(
8879 − 159175𝛼 + 1121468𝛼2 − 4345146𝛼3 + 10518916𝛼4 − 16835992𝛼5+
18156848𝛼6 − 13059840𝛼7 + 5991808𝛼8 − 1576960𝛼9 + 179200𝛼10 + K1 (2219 − 22743𝛼+





1 − 8𝛼 + 8𝛼2 + K1
)2(127 − 632𝛼 + 1180𝛼2 − 976𝛼3 + 304𝛼4 + (7 − 36𝛼 + 32𝛼2)K1)2).
When the government sets up tradable emission permits, the following results emerge. Let denote K2 =
√
88 − 408𝛼 + 665𝛼2 − 444𝛼3 + 100𝛼4.
In this case, the following emerges:
𝜃e = 10 − 23𝛼 + 10𝛼
2 − K2




1 − 3𝛼 + 2𝛼2
)
(K2 − 3 + 4𝛼)
K2(4 − 27𝛼 + 26𝛼2) + (144 − 704𝛼 + 1275𝛼2 − 1012𝛼3 + 300𝛼4)
,
Ŵe = 24A2 (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 2𝛼)
(
9776 − 192480𝛼 + 1426413𝛼2 − 5718281𝛼3 + 14203780𝛼4 − 23216534𝛼5
+ 25510100𝛼6 − 18692432𝛼7 + 8758464𝛼8 − 2368800𝛼9 + 280000𝛼10 + K2 (2956 − 29757𝛼+
137079𝛼2 − 371278𝛼3 + 635206𝛼4 − 692600𝛼5 + 465120𝛼6 − 174720𝛼7 + 28000𝛼8
))
∕
((2 − 11𝛼 + 10𝛼2 + K2)2(144 − 704𝛼 + 1275𝛼2 − 1012𝛼3 + 300𝛼4 + K2(4 − 27𝛼 + 26𝛼2))2).
When the government sets up emission standards, the following results emerge. Let denote K3 =
√
113 − 496𝛼 + 764𝛼2 − 480𝛼3 + 100𝛼4. In
this case, the following emerges:
𝜃s = 11 − 24𝛼 + 10𝛼
2 − K3




1 − 3𝛼 + 2𝛼2
)
(K3 − 4 + 5𝛼)
K3(1 − 24𝛼 + 26𝛼2) + (179 − 808𝛼 + 1372𝛼2 − 1040𝛼3 + 300𝛼4)
,
Ŵs = 24A2 (1 − 𝛼) (1 − 2𝛼)
(
1160787𝛼2 − 7298 − 78242𝛼 − 5620303𝛼3 + 14953026𝛼4 − 24988188𝛼5+
27480484𝛼6 − 19941660𝛼7 + 9197400𝛼8 − 2436000𝛼9 + 280000𝛼10 + K3 (4686 − 39250𝛼+
158025𝛼2 − 396165𝛼3 + 654980𝛼4 − 705890𝛼5 + 472020𝛼6 − 176400𝛼7 + 28000𝛼8
))
∕
((1− 10𝛼 + 10𝛼2 + K3)2(179 − 808𝛼 + 1372𝛼2 − 1040𝛼3 + 300𝛼4 + K3
(
1 − 24𝛼 + 26𝛼2
)
)2).
Appendix 8. N firms compete in the product market.
When the government implements an environmental tax, the following results emerge. Let denote K1n =
√
16 − 72n + 81n2 − 18n3 + 9n4. Solving
this case, we find the following:
𝜃tn = 4 − 5n − 3n
2 + K1n
8n(1 − n) ,
t̂ =
3(A − c)(n− 1)2
(
9n + 3n2 − 4 + K1n
)
(16 + 52n − 69n2 + 15n3 + 9n4 + 9n5) − K1n(4 + 13n − 6n2 − 3n3)
,
Ŵtn = 12(A − c)2n(1 + n)(n − 1)(−2816 + 1312n + 29904n2 − 62718n3 + 33039n4 − 549n5+)
2943n6 − 6345n7 + 405n8 + 729n9 − 243n10 + 243n11 + K1n(704 + 1256n − 4650n2+)
(4641n3 + 180n4 − 1161n5 + 54n6 − 81n7 + 81n9))∕((3n2 − 4 − 3n + K1n)2)
(((16 + 52n − 69n2 + 15n3 + 9n4 + 9n5) − K1n(4 + 13n − 6n2 − 3n3))2).
When the government sets up tradable emission permits, the following results emerge. Let denote K2n =
√
1 − 48n + 54n2 + 9n4. In this case the
following emerges:
𝜃en = 7 − 8n − 3n
2 + K2n
8n(1 − n) ,
Ê = 6(A − c)(n− 1) (−4 + K2n)(1 + 25n − 18n2 + 6n3 + 9n4 + 9n5) − K2n(1 + 13n − 3n2 − 3n3)
,
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Ŵen = 3(A − c)2n (1 + n) (n − 1) (5 + 21n + 3n2 + 3n3)∕
((−1 − 46n − 213n2 + 60n3 + 45n4 + 18n5 + 9n6) + K1n(1 + 10n + 12n2 + 6n3 + 3n4)).
When the government sets up emission standards, the following results emerge. Let denote K3n =√
256 − 1824n + 4113n2 − 3672n3 + 1278n4 − 216n5 + 81n6. In this case, the following emerges:
𝜃sn = 16 − 41n + 12n
2 + 9n3 − K3n
n(32 − 56n + 24n2) ,
ŝ = 6(A − c)(n− 1)(3n − 4)(28 + 24n + K3n)∕((256 + 448n − 1623n2 + 1473n3−)
((666n4 + 198n5 − 135n6 + 81n7) + K3n(16 + 49n − 63n2 − 3n3 + 9n4)),
Ŵsn = 12(A − c)2n (1 + n) (n − 1) (3n − 4)
(
8830976 − 38625280n − 24916800n2 + 515259600n3−
1459293552n4 + 2068182648n5 − 1680131646n6 + 791166069n7 − 221396895n8 + 65562372n9−
31875768n10 + 2928150n11 + 7708446n12 − 4365252n13 + 1246590n14 − 334611n15 + 59049n16+
K3n
(
551936 − 510016n − 4789680n2 + 16017936n3 − 23194728n4 + 17015886n5 − 4416957n6−




40 − 33n − 12n2 + 9n3 + K3n
)2 ((256 + 448n − 1623n2 + 1473n3 − 666n4 + 198n5 − 135n6+
81n7
)
+ K3n(16 + 49n − 63n2 − 3n3 + 9n4)
)2) .
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